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Abstract. The differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol is
formalised as a prepare-and-measure scheme and translated into an equivalent
entanglement-based protocol. A necessary condition for security is that Bob’s
measurement can detect the entanglement of the distributed state in the entanglement-
based translation, which implies that his measurement is described by non-commuting
POVM elements. This condition is shown to be met.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a means of distributing a secure key between two
parties, traditionally Alice and Bob, who wish to communicate privately [1, 2]. The
security of the resulting shared key is independent of a potential eavesdropper’s com-
putational and technological power, if used as a one-time pad [3].
In ‘prepare-and-measure (P&M)’ terminology, a QKD protocol involves Alice preparing
a set of quantum states into which a sequence of symbols has been encoded. These states
are then sent to Bob via a quantum channel, who performs a measurement that serves
to decode the signal and estimate the noise introduced by the channel, which is con-
servatively attributed to eavesdropping [2]. A general QKD protocol can be described
equivalently as an entanglement-based (EB) scheme [4], involving the preparation of a
bipartite entangled state. When Alice performs a measurement on her subsystem, she
effectively prepares the same set of quantum states described in the P&M picture, which
is then measured by Bob with the same measurement.
In both the P&M and in the equivalent EB scheme, a public classical channel, of which
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Alice and Bob are the authenticated users, is subsequently employed to filter a secure
key out of the initial sequence of symbols. The classical data produced in a secure
QKD protocol must imply non-classical correlations [5] between the systems held by
Alice and Bob in the EB translation. Therefore, a necessary condition for the security
of a QKD protocol is that the measurements performed by Alice and Bob in the EB
translation must detect entanglement in the effectively distributed state [6], which in
turn implies that Bob’s measurement must consist of non-commuting POVM elements
(see Appendix).
QKD protocols can be divided into three classes: discrete-variable (DV), continuous-
variable (CV) and distributed-phase-reference protocols [2]. Differential-phase-shift
(DPS)QKD is an example of a distributed-phase-reference protocol.
The form of DPSQKD discussed here was proposed in 2003 by Inoue et al. [7] as a
scheme offering a higher key creation efficiency than conventional fibre-based BB84. In
2006 Waks et al. [8] derived a proof of the security of DPSQKD under the assumption
that Eve is restricted to individual attacks. They showed that individual attacks are
more powerful than certain so-called sequential attacks, thus ensuring security against
this form of attack also. In the same year Diamanti et al. [9] reported an implementa-
tion of DPSQKD secure against individual attacks over 100km. In 2007 Tsurumaru [10]
introduced an improved version of the aforementioned sequential attack that decreases
the distance over which DPSQKD is secure to less than 95km, thus rendering the above
implementation insecure. In 2009 Ma et al. [11] reported an experimental realisation
of DPSQKD using superconducting single-photon detectors, with a quantum bit error
rate of less than 4%. Later in 2009, a proof of the unconditional security of a protocol
related to DPSQKD, using single photons instead of coherent pulses, was published [12].
However, this proof does not imply the unconditional security of the original DPSQKD
protocol.
There are a number of practical advantages to DPSQKD, namely: its suitability for
fibre transmissions; use of readily available telecommunication tools; no requirement for
a single photon source (the generated states are assumed to be easily produced coherent
states) and thus high communication efficiency. However, bounds for the unconditional
security of DPSQKD, and other examples of distributed-phase-reference protocols like
the coherent-one-way (COW) protocol [13, 14], have not yet been found.
A number of techniques have been used to show the unconditional security of DV pro-
tocols [15, 16, 17, 18], and security proofs for CV protocols are developing to a similar
level [19]. For DV and CV protocols, the notion of virtual entanglement plays an es-
sential role in security proofs based on entanglement distillation which are applied to
the EB version. The same security proofs then also directly apply to the equivalent
P&M scheme. Note that the EB version is not necessarily implemented (hence the word
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‘virtual’), but serves as a theoretical tool owing to its equivalence to the P&M scheme.
An EB translation of a P&M QKD protocol where the precondition for security on
Bob’s measurement is satisfied, is a necessary first step towards a potential uncondi-
tional security proof for the protocol based on entanglement distillation. The purpose
of this paper is to propose and formalise an EB translation of DPSQKD, as well as
to show that Bob’s measurement contains non-commuting POVM elements. This is a
necessary condition for the unconditional security of the EB translation.
This paper is organised as follows: In section 2 of this article, DPSQKD is described
as a P&M scheme. In section 3 the P&M description of DPSQKD is translated into
an equivalent EB scheme. In section 4 a necessary requirement for security- that Bob’s
measurement is described by non-commuting POVM elements- is shown to be fulfilled.
2. DPSQKD as a P&M Scheme
A general P&M protocol specifies a quantum state |Ψ(S)〉 that encodes a sequence of
N symbols S = {s1, ..., sN} prepared by Alice. In CV and DV protocols, |Ψ(S)〉 can
be written in tensor product form where there is a one-to-one correspondence between
each symbol si and each state |ψ(si)〉 that encodes that symbol:
|Ψ(S)〉 =
N⊗
i=1
|ψ(si)〉. (1)
The si’s are independent, and the state sent in each time interval i can therefore be
considered independently as the state |ψ(si)〉. Note that the states |ψ(si)〉 must be
non-orthogonal since a set of orthogonal states can be perfectly copied by a potential
eavesdropper.
In DPSQKD Alice prepares a sequence of N + 1 symbols S ′ = {s′0, ..., s′N}, s′i ∈ {0, 1},
according to which she modulates the phase of each of N +1 attenuated coherent pulses
by {0, pi}. The pulses are separated by time ∆t. After modulation the phase of the ith
pulse is given by φi = s
′
ipi. From the bit string S
′ Alice calculates the potential key
bit string S via the relation si = s
′
i−1 + s
′
i, where addition is modulo 2. Let the time
intervals in which Alice sends the pulses be denoted by i = 0, ..., N . The quantum state
|Ψ(S ′)〉DPS that encodes the sequence S ′ can then be written as a tensor product
|Ψ(S ′)〉DPS =
N⊗
i=0
|(−1)s′iα〉. (2)
The requirement of non-orthogonality of the states |ψ(s′i)〉 (compare with |ψ(si)〉 from
Eq. (1)) is met, since the coherent pulses have an average photon number |α|2 of less
than one.
The state sent in each time interval i can be considered independently if written (as
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Figure 1: QKD system for the implementation of the DPSQKD protocol. LASER: coherent
light source, ATT: attenuator, PS: phase shifter, BS: symmetric beamsplitter, D: detector.
The ith incoming pulse is split at BS1. The part which propagates on path 3 arrives at BS2
simultaneously with the part of the (i+ 1)th pulse coming from path 2.
above) as |(−1)s′iα〉. Here there is a one-to-one correspondence between each symbol s′i
and each state |ψ(s′i)〉 encoding that symbol, but since the consecutive elements of S are
not independent there is no such correspondence between potential key bits and pre-
pared states, as in the general case. And this is the reason existing methods of proving
unconditional security cannot be applied to the DPSQKD protocol, since they rely on
the mutual independence of all potential key bits. However, the form of Eq. (2) allows
a formulation of P&M DPSQKD as an equivalent EB scheme.
Subsequent to Alice’s preparation and sending of the state |Ψ(S)〉 to Bob in a general
P&M scheme, Bob performs a measurement which decodes the states. Measurement re-
sults contribute to the key, but are also used to estimate the loss of quantum coherence
in the sent state.
In DPSQKD Bob’s measurement is initiated at a time ∆t after the first pulse has
entered his interferometer, i.e., in time interval i = 1, and there is the possibility of a
detection event that can contribute to the key in this and subsequent time intervals up
to i = N . The transformation of |Ψ(S)〉DPS in Bob’s interferometer forms part of his
measurement (see Fig. 1) and is described by the following transformations:
The incoming pulses enter symmetric beam splitter 1 (BS1) in the path labelled 0 and
are described by field operators aˆ†0, while path 1 contains vacuum. The beam splitter
transformation for aˆ†0 in terms of operators aˆ
†
2 and aˆ
†
3 for the output paths labelled 2
and 3 is
aˆ†0
BS1→ 1√
2
aˆ†2 + e
−iφ1 1√
2
aˆ†3. (3)
Transformations for symmetric beam splitter 2 (BS2) in terms of operators aˆ
†
4 and aˆ
†
5
for the output paths labelled 4 and 5 are given by
aˆ†2
BS2→ 1√
2
aˆ†4 − eiφ2
1√
2
aˆ†5, (4)
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aˆ†3
BS2→ e−iφ2 1√
2
aˆ†4 +
1√
2
aˆ†5. (5)
The total action of the interferometer is described in terms of the creation operators for
each time interval i for the signals entering Bob’s interferometer in path 0, aˆ†i0 , and the
two outgoing paths, aˆ†i4 and aˆ
†i
5 :
aˆ†i0
I→ 1
2
(aˆ†i4 − eiφ2 aˆ†i5 + ei(φ∆t−φ1)(e−iφ2 aˆ†(i+1)4 + aˆ†(i+1)5 )),
=
1
2
(aˆ†i4 − eiφ2 aˆ†i5 + aˆ†(i+1)4 + eiφ2 aˆ†(i+1)5 ), (6)
where the beam splitters are chosen such that their relative phase shifts compensate
the phase shift associated with the time delay ∆t in the upper arm of the interferome-
ter i.e., φ1 + φ2 = φ∆t. This time delay must be equal to the time separation between
incoming pulses in path 0, so that components of consecutive pulses can interfere at BS2.
If Alice sends the state |Ψ(S ′)〉DPS, the state |Ψ′(S ′)〉DPS entering Bob’s detectors in
time intervals i in paths 4 and 5 after transformation in the interferometer, is expanded
as
|Ψ′(S ′)〉DPS =
N⊗
i=1
|1
2
α(eiφi + eiφi−1)〉i4|
1
2
αeiφ2(eiφi − eiφi−1)〉i5
=
N⊗
i=1
|1
2
α((−1)s′i + (−1)s′i−1)〉i4|
1
2
αeiφ2((−1)s′i − (−1)s′i−1)〉i5,
(7)
recalling that φi = s
′
ipi.
Bob uses detectors D0 and D1 that discern vacuum from one or more photons (so-
called bucket detectors), in paths 4 and 5, respectively. A detector ‘click’ will occur
when one or more photons are detected. For an incoming coherent state |β〉4(|β〉5),
detector D0(D1) will click with probability 1 − e−|β|2 . These probabilities depend on
the phase modulation performed by Alice, which is determined by the bit string S ′. For
s′i + s
′
i−1 = si = 0(1), the probability of D1(D0) clicking is zero, and hence a click in
D0(D1) corresponds to the potential key bit si = 0(1). This situation is summarised in
Table 1.
Note, the probability of a detector firing is independent of the phase, and there-
fore Bob cannot distinguish the two states |α〉i and | − α〉i that correspond to one si.
Bob then utilises the authenticated classical channel to communicate to Alice the time
intervals i∗ in which he recorded a detection event in one of his detectors (which is not in
every time interval since the average photon number |α|2 per pulse is less than one). In
the error-free case, this process serves to filter a secure key S∗ out of the initial sequence
S, since for each i∗ Alice and Bob can add an identical bit, si∗ , to the secure filtered
key.
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s′i−1 s
′
i si |ψ〉i p(D0) p(D1)
0 0 0 |α〉4|0〉5 1− e−|α|2 0
1 1 0 | − α〉4|0〉5 1− e−|α|2 0
0 1 1 |0〉4|αeφ2〉5 0 1− e−|α|2
1 0 1 |0〉4| − αeφ2〉5 0 1− e−|α|2
Table 1: DPSQKD detection and key extraction table: A coherent state |β〉4(|β〉5) results
in detector D0(D1) clicking with probability 1 − e−|β|2 . These probabilities depend on
the phase modulation performed by Alice, which is determined by the bit string S′. For
s′i + s′i−1 = si = 0(1), the probability of D1(D0) clicking is zero, and hence a click in D0(D1)
corresponds to the potential key bit si = 0(1).
3. DPSQKD as an EB Scheme
The existence of equivalent EB translations for P&M QKD schemes was first shown
by Bennett et al. [4]. In the EB translation of a general P&M protocol, the bipartite
entangled state
|Φ〉AB = 1√
D
∑
S
|S〉A ⊗ |Ψ(S)〉B (8)
is prepared, where D is the number of possible S sequences and the states |S〉A form an
orthogonal basis for the D-dimensional space. By measuring in this basis, Alice learns
one sequence S and the corresponding |Ψ(S)〉 is effectively sent to Bob, who performs
an identical measurement to that performed in the P&M scheme.
Since the si’s are independent (and let them be of an alphabet of size d), |Φ〉AB can also
be written as
|Φ〉AB =
N⊗
i=0
(
1√
d
∑
si
|si〉A ⊗ |ψ(si)〉B
)
(9)
where the states |si〉 form an orthogonal basis for a d-dimensional space.
In the EB translation of DPSQKD, the bipartite entangled state
|ΦDPS〉AB = 1√
2N+1
∑
S′
|S ′〉A ⊗ (|Ψ(S ′)〉DPS)B
=
1√
2N+1
∑
S′
|S ′〉A ⊗ (
N⊗
i=0
|(−1)s′iα〉)B, (10)
is prepared.
The total entangled state |ΦDPS〉AB can also be written as
|ΦDPS〉AB =
N⊗
i=0
 1√
2
∑
s′i=0,1
|s′i〉A ⊗ |ψ(s′i)〉B

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=
N⊗
i=0
 1√
2
∑
s′i=0,1
|s′i〉A ⊗ |(−1)s
′
iα〉B

=
N⊗
i=0
(
1√
2
{|0〉A ⊗ |α〉B + |1〉A ⊗ | − α〉B}
)i
, (11)
where the states |0〉 and |1〉 form the arbitrary orthogonal basis in which Alice measures,
and correspond to s′i = 0 or 1 respectively. Again, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between each s′i and each state |ψ(s′i)〉 encoding that symbol, although the potential key
bits si are not independent of each other.
Consequences of this non-independence are that Alice must keep track of the time
intervals to which her measurement outcomes correspond, thus incrementally building
her knowledge of the string S via the relation si = s
′
i−1 + s
′
i. Subsequent to Alice’s
projections in the arbitrary orthogonal basis {|0〉, |1〉} performed on her subsystem, the
resulting string of attenuated coherent pulses that form Bob’s subsystem must be sep-
arated by the same time delay associated with the delay in Bob’s interferometer, ∆t.
Bob learns a fraction |α|2 of the si’s in string S by interfering consecutive pulses to
learn their relative phases. He performs the same total measurement as in the P&M
description.
4. Bob’s Measurement
Bob’s measurement can be described conveniently in the framework of generalized
measurements, where the measurement statistics are given by a positive-operator valued
measure (POVM) [20]. The POVM associates with each measurement result j, a positive
operator Ej, termed an effect or POVM element. The expectation value of the effect
Ej determines the probability to obtain result j:
pj = 〈ψ|Ej|ψ〉 , (12)
where |ψ〉 is the state of the system considered just before the measurement is carried
out. The effects satisfy
∑
j Ej = I, where I is the identity operator, in order to guarantee
that the probabilities sum up to unity. In this formalism, common projection measure-
ments of quantum mechanical observables are described by effects which are mutually
commuting projectors onto the eigenspaces corresponding to the measurement results.
In general, e.g. for indirect projection measurements, the effects are neither projectors
nor do they commute.
A necessary requirement for the shared bit string to be secret is that the performed
measurements must be able to detect entanglement in the state effectively distributed
between Alice and Bob in the EB scheme [6]. This is not possible if Bob’s measurement
results correspond only to mutually commuting effects (see Appendix). This condi-
tion applies also to the P&M version of any QKD protocol, where the measurements
must be the same as in the equivalent EB transcription. In an intercept-and-resend
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attack on a P&M protocol where Bob’s measurement is described by only commuting
effects, an eavesdropper could measure an observable which commutes with all of Bob’s
effects without changing the statistics of Bob’s measurement and thus remain unde-
tected. Therefore, a precondition for security is that some of the effects constituting
Bob’s measurement must be non-commuting.
In DPSQKD Bob’s measurement is associated with a total number 22N of possible
results and as many corresponding effects, since in the time intervals i ∈ {1, ..., N},
he projects onto either vacuum (no click) or a one-or-more photon state (click) in each
of two detectors, D0 and D1. He obtains an average of |α|2N detection events which
contribute to the key. The effects constituting Bob’s measurement are written as follows:
G1 = |0〉14〈0| ⊗ |0〉15〈0| ⊗ |0〉24〈0| ⊗ |0〉25〈0|...⊗ |0〉N4 〈0| ⊗ |0〉N5 〈0|,
G2 =
∞∑
n=1
|n〉14〈n| ⊗ |0〉15〈0| ⊗ |0〉24〈0| ⊗ |0〉25〈0|...⊗ |0〉N4 〈0| ⊗ |0〉N5 〈0|,
G3 = |0〉14〈0| ⊗ |0〉15〈0| ⊗ |0〉24〈0| ⊗
∞∑
n=1
|n〉25〈n|...⊗ |0〉N4 〈0| ⊗ |0〉N4 〈0|,
...
G22N =
∞∑
n=1
|n〉14〈n| ⊗
∞∑
n=1
|n〉15〈n|...
∞∑
n=1
|n〉N4 〈n| ⊗
∞∑
n=1
|n〉N5 〈n|. (13)
Bob’s measurement is thus seen to be a degenerate projection measurement of photon
number, where [Gi, Gj] = 0 for all i, j, since the inner product of vacuum with a one-
or-more photon state is always zero. It is easy to show that this result does not change
if Bob’s interferometer is considered as part of his measurement apparatus. Since the
action of an interferometer is unitary, the result for the transformed effects remains
the same: [U †GiU,U †GjU ] = 0. At this point the protocol appears to be insecure! In
the remainder of this section it will be shown that the necessary condition on Bob’s
measurement- the non-commutativity of effects- nevertheless is met.
For this purpose, recall that Bob’s interferometer has two input paths (path 0 and
path 1, see Fig. 1). Only path 0 is populated, it carries the light sent by Alice in state
|ψ〉0 := |Ψ(S ′)〉DPS (see Eq. (2)), while path 1 contains the vacuum state |0〉0 at all
times. When including the interferometer in Bob’s measurement, the probability to ob-
tain any result j ∈ {1, 2..., 22N} can be expressed by means of the state |Ξ〉 := |ψ〉0⊗|0〉1
of the light entering the interferometer as:
pj = 〈Ξ|U †GjU |Ξ〉 = 0〈ψ|Ej|ψ〉0 (14)
with
Ej := 1〈0|U †GjU |0〉1 . (15)
While the action of the interferometer is represented by the operator U which maps the
incoming state in paths 0 and 1 to the the outgoing state in paths 4 and 5, the new
effects Ej are operators that act only on states in path 0. The expectation value with
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respect to the vacuum state in path 1 reduces the action of the operator U †GjU to the
subspace of states in path 0, similarly to a partial trace. According to Eq. (14), the
probability for any of Bob’s measurement results can thus be expressed only in terms
of the state sent by Alice using effects Ej. It is well known that such a reduction of a
projection-valued measure (PVM) as given by the effects U †GjU can result in a POVM
with non-commuting effects. In fact, any POVM can be represented as a projection of
a PVM acting on a higher dimensional Hilbert space (see the Theorem of Neumark [21]).
Indeed, the resulting effects Ej are not all mutually commuting and therefore satisfy
the necessary condition for security. Consider, for example, the effects E2 and E3 that
correspond to a click in D0 in time interval 1 and a click in D1 in time interval 2,
respectively:
E2 = 1〈0|U †G2U |0〉1 =
∞∑
n=1
1
4nn!
(aˆ†00 + aˆ
†1
0 )
n|0〉〈0|(aˆ00 + aˆ10)n, (16)
E3 = 1〈0|U †G3U |0〉1 =
∞∑
m=1
1
4mm!
(aˆ†10 − aˆ†20 )m|0〉〈0|(aˆ10 − aˆ20)m. (17)
The commutator [E2, E3] is given by:
[E2, E3] =
∞∑
n=1
1
4nn!
(aˆ†00 + aˆ
†1
0 )
n|0〉T
∞∑
m=1
1
4mm!
〈0|(aˆ10 − aˆ20)m
−
∞∑
m=1
1
4mm!
(aˆ†10 − aˆ†20 )m|0〉T
∞∑
n=1
1
4nn!
〈0|(aˆ00 + aˆ10)n, (18)
where the term T is defined and evaluated as:
T ≡ 〈0|(aˆ00 + aˆ10)n(aˆ†10 − aˆ†20 )m|0〉
=
n∑
k=0
m∑
l=0
(
n
k
)(
m
l
)
(−1)l〈0|(aˆ00)n−k(aˆ10)k(aˆ†10 )m−l(aˆ†20 )l|0〉
= n!, (19)
withn = m = k and l = 0.
Note that T = T ∗ is a non-zero real number.
The commutator [E2, E3] is then given by:
[E2, E3] =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
l=0
n∑
k=0
1
16nn!
(
n
l
)(
n
k
)
× {(−1)k(aˆ†00 )n−l(aˆ†10 )l|0〉〈0|(aˆ10)n−k(aˆ20)k
− (−1)l(aˆ†10 )n−l(aˆ†20 )l|0〉〈0|(aˆ00)n−k(aˆ10)k}
6= 0. (20)
Since the operators aˆ
(†)0
0 , aˆ
(†)1
0 and aˆ
(†)2
0 act on different Hilbert spaces, the matrix ele-
ments do not cancel. Therefore all terms in the sum are non-zero.
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It has therefore been shown that there do exist non-commuting effects in Bob’s mea-
surement in the EB translation of DPSQKD, i.e., [E2, E3] 6= 0, which is a necessary
requirement for the detection of entanglement in the effectively distributed state. The
protocol has thus been shown to satisfy a necessary condition for security, i.e. that
Bob’s measurement involves non-commuting effects.
5. Conclusion
DPSQKD, an example of a distributed-phase-reference protocol, has here been described
firstly as a P&M scheme, and secondly translated into an EB scheme, thus fitting into
the framework of description for a generic QKD protocol as outlined by Scarani et
al. [2]. DPSQKD has been shown to satisfy a necessary condition for security, i.e.,
Bob’s measurement involves non-commuting effects. The EB translation of DPSQKD
formalised here, together with the proof that the necessary condition for security is met,
can be considered a first step towards a potential unconditional security proof for the
protocol based on entanglement distillation.
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Appendix
A theorem by Curty, Lewenstein and Lu¨tkenhaus [6] states the following:
Entanglement as a precondition for secure QKD
A necessary precondition for a set of POVM elements Fa ⊗Gb together with the proba-
bility distribution of their occurance P (A,B) to lead to a secret key via public commu-
nication is that the presence of entanglement in the effectively distributed state |ψ〉AB
can be detected via an entanglement witness W =
∑
ab cabFa⊗Gb with cab real such that
Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all separable states and Tr(Wρ) < 0 for at least one entangled state.
Suppose W =
∑
ab cabFa ⊗ Gb is an entanglement witness with cab real such that
Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all separable states and Tr(Wρ) < 0 for at least one entangled state,
and that Fa and Gb are Alice and Bob’s POVM elements in a QKD protocol. Assume
that in each time interval Alice projects onto the set of orthogonal states |A〉, and that
Bob projects onto the set of orthogonal states |B〉. Then W is diagonal in the basis
{|A〉A, |B〉B}:
W =
∑
A,B
λAB|A〉A〈A| ⊗ |B〉B〈B|. (21)
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Since W is a witness and Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all separable states |ψsep〉, it follows that for
|ψsep〉 = |α〉A|β〉B
〈ψsep|W |ψsep〉 ≥ 0
⇒ 〈α|A〈β|B ⊗
∑
A,B
λAB|A〉A〈A| ⊗ |B〉B〈B| ⊗ |α〉A|β〉B ≥ 0
⇒ ∑
A,B
λAB〈α|A〉〈β|B〉〈α|A〉〈β|B〉 ≥ 0
⇒ λαβ ≥ 0 ∀ α, β (22)
Since W has diagonal representation
∑
i λi|i〉〈i| with λi non-negative, W is a positive
operator. Therefore 〈ψ|W |ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all |ψ〉 including all entangled states and W can-
not be an entanglement witness. As a result a witness of entanglement in the effectively
distributed state cannot be constructed, and the protocol cannot lead to a secret key
via public communication.
In the EB translation of a P&M protocol, Alice is assumed to project onto a set of
orthogonal states, therefore a necessary condition on the elements of Bob’s POVM is
that they should not all commute.
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